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Keith N. Hylton*

Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law
ABSTRACT
This Article is about “big data” and antitrust law. Big data, for my
purposes, refers to digital platforms that enable the discovery and
sharing of information by consumers, and the harvesting and analysis
of consumer data by the platform. The obvious example of such a platform is Google. The big platforms owe their market dominance not to
anticompetitive conduct, but to economies of scale. This Article discusses three types of anticompetitive conduct associated with digital
platforms: kill zone expropriation, acquisition of nascent rivals, and
denial of access to data. There is nothing so unusual about digital platforms that would require a reform of the antitrust laws. Some are described as two-sided markets, but this designation, even after Ohio v.
American Express Co., should not present an obstacle to the application of antitrust law.
Keywords: digital platform competition, platform acquisitions, big
data and antitrust, kill zone competition, data and competition, Amex,
two sided markets, data monopolies, network effects and competition,
data as property
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is about big data and antitrust law. The first question
I should address is precisely what I mean by the term “big data.” A
search of the term on the internet reveals amorphous definitions, leaving one with the impression that big data is a conceptual category that
includes several different things.
Big data, for my purposes, refers to digital platforms that enable
the discovery and sharing of information by consumers, and the harvesting and analysis of consumer data by the platform. Because of the
enormous quantities of data, the platforms must use algorithms and
often machine learning to process the data. Thus, big data includes, in
this definition, a reference to the sophisticated processes by which
data are analyzed.
The obvious example of such a digital platform is Google. Consumers search for information on Google, and Google uses the information
from consumer searches to improve its own search algorithms and to
provide information to advertisers on consumer preferences. Google
tracks the activities of consumers, as far as possible, to build out its
database.
The focus here is on competition issues associated with digital platforms.1 However, competition is a broad concept itself. There are
many non-competition issues associated with digital platforms, such
as privacy, which, on further inspection, are capable of being described as competition issues after all.2 This Article takes a broad
brush to the topic and sweeps in non-competition issues where
relevant.
The largest platforms owe their market dominance not to anticompetitive conduct, but to economies of scale. Still, three types of anticompetitive conduct are associated with digital platforms: kill zone
expropriation, acquisition of nascent rivals, and denial of access to
data.3 There is nothing so unusual about the platforms that would
require a reform of the antitrust laws. Some have been described as
1. For previous contributions to this topic, see D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford,
Antitrust and Regulating Big Data, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129 (2016); Joshua
D. Wright & Elyse Dorsey, Antitrust Analysis of Big Data, 4(2) COMPETITION LAW
& POL’Y DEBATE 35 (Dec. 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3165278 [https://perma
.unl.edu/YE9S-V82N]; and Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Debunking the
Myths Over Big Data and Antitrust, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (May 2015),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2612562 [https://perma.unl.edu/KL2L-ENK].
2. Wright & Dorsey, supra note 1, at 38.
3. The focus on specific anticompetitive theories is probably the feature that distinguishes this Article from previous contributions. Sokol & Comerford, supra note
1, offers a broad survey of the alleged anticompetitive harms and potential competition benefits of big data. Similarly, Wright & Dorsey, supra note 1, offers a
survey of anticompetitive theories and addresses whether antitrust law should be
modified for big data competition claims. Both Sokol and Wright see little need to
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two-sided markets, but this designation, even after Amex,4 should not
present an obstacle to the application of antitrust law.
Part II below discusses the economics of digital platforms and the
processes that have generated economies of scale. Scale benefits platform consumers, but it also precipitates injuries to consumers in the
form of privacy invasions, online harassment, and intellectual property infringement. Part III examines anticompetitive theories likely to
be asserted against digital platforms. Part IV discusses the antitrust
law applicable to these theories.
II. PLATFORMS
The digital platforms with which most of us are familiar are Google
and Facebook. Google has a dominant market share in online search
in every country except Russia and China.5 Facebook has roughly two
billion users—almost half of the entire population of internet users.6
These large customer bases enable Google and Facebook to amass
large quantities of data on billions of consumers.7 The data are used to
improve services offered on the digital platforms. Google, for example,
uses its data on consumers to enable advertisers to target consumers
who are most likely to purchase the advertised products. Data also

4.
5.

6.

7.

modify existing antitrust law for big data cases. For a view opposing those of
Sokol and Wright, see Stucke & Grunes, supra note 1.
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
Google is permitted to operate in Russia, but is blocked in China. For statistics on
Google’s share of online search by country, see J. Clement, Share of Desktop
Search Traffic Originating from Google in Selected Countries as of June 2018,
STATISTA (Mar. 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/220534/googles-shareof-search-market-in-selected-countries/ [https://perma.unl.edu/2335-XD6M].
Facebook had 2.32 billion users as of the fourth quarter of 2018. See Facebook:
Number of Monthly Active Users Worldwide 2008–2018, STATISTA (Jan. 2019),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebookusers-worldwide/ [https://perma.unl.edu/FH3X-XR4M]. Facebook users constitute roughly half of the total number of internet users. See Pilable, Two Billion
Internet Users Are Not on Facebook, OVERGROWN PATH (July 16, 2018), https://
www.overgrownpath.com/2018/07/two-billion-internet-users-are-not-on.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/XVX3-NQBD].
On Google data collection, see Douglas Schmidt’s survey following a day in the
life of an Android user, exploring the ways in which Google collects user data
through applications such as YouTube, Google Searches, Google Maps, Chrome,
and other Google-owned applications. Douglas C. Schmidt, GOOGLE DATA COLLECTION, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY (Aug. 15, 2018), https://digitalcontentnext.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/DCN-Google-Data-Collection-Paper.pdf [https://perma
.unl.edu/T39H-BZH3]; On Facebook data collection, see Avantika Monnappa,
How Facebook is Using Big Data—The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, SIMPLILEARN
(July 6, 2018), https://www.simplilearn.com/how-facebook-is-using-big-data-arti
cle [https://perma.unl.edu/UJV4-PJKK].
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enable Google to continuously improve the quality of its search
algorithms.8
For digital platforms such as Google and Facebook, size results
mostly from economies of scale. As the number of consumers increases, Google can amass more data and use the data to improve its
search experience and the accuracy of advertising matches. In other
words, as the platform expands and obtains more data, the cost of providing a given unit of service (e.g., the answer to a search query) falls.
Sophisticated data processing methods, such as machine learning and
artificial intelligence, further enhance the scale economies effect.
There are two processes giving rise to economies of scale in the
digital platform markets. One is fixed costs. Much of the costs of providing Google’s services reside in the employment of engineers, and
Google has consistently bid for the highest quality of this form of labor. Increasingly, digital platforms are also hiring content moderators
to make sure that the material presented to consumers does not unduly tarnish their brands. The costs of engineers are fixed, in the
sense that the volume of the search service Google provides is not
highly sensitive to the number of engineers the firm hires, after it
reaches a sufficient scale to generate the service. In other words, once
a given number of engineers produce the search machine, consumers
can use the machine anywhere from zero to an uncountable number of
times per day, and the cost to Google is largely the same. The cost of
content moderators is probably more dependent on the number of
users of the service, but even here the elasticity of moderator cost to
intensity of consumer use is well below one.
The other source of economies of scale is data. Data enable engineers to improve the quality of the search process at Google. Thus,
each consumer, by providing data, lowers the unit cost of servicing the
next consumer.9 The intensity of this effect is magnified by the use of
sophisticated data processing methods. Google, therefore, has an interest in investing resources into the enhancement of data processing
methods, such as machine learning and artificial intelligence. The demand for such processes from the digital platforms, in turn, bids up
the wages of researchers who specialize in data processing methods,
bidding some of them out of their academic positions and into
industry.
8. How Search Algorithms Work, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search/how
searchworks/algorithms/ [https://perma.unl.edu/4E94-4PVW] (last visited July 8,
2019).
9. Economies of scale in data include traditional network effects in addition to the
improvements in service quality, on both sides of a platform, driven by data. See
James Currier, The Network Effects Manual: 13 Different Network Effects (and
Counting), MEDIUM (Jan. 9, 2018), https://medium.com/@nfx/the-network-effectsmanual-13-different-network-effects-and-counting-a3e07b23017d [https://perma
.unl.edu/D5RN-BHG5].
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Google also has an interest in investing resources into the creation
and harvesting of more data on its consumers. It is interesting to note
that for many years after Google entered the market, observers wondered how the service would become a source of revenue—that is, how
search could be monetized.10 That question has been answered:
Google’s annual revenue in 2018 was $137 billion.11 Data have proven
to be monetizable. Because data are monetizable, Google gathers as
much data as it can on users through their own search inquiries and
through monitoring their activities online. Using the acquired data,
Google generates a detailed map of the preferences, personal characteristics, and location of every internet search consumer.
In addition to the scale economies effect, the law provides a subsidy
that has aided the expansion of digital platforms. Under Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act,12 digital platforms such as
Google are treated as information intermediaries rather than publishers.13 This relieves platforms of tort liability for harms caused by their
activities. Another safe harbor from liability is provided by Section
512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which protects platforms
from copyright liability if they take down an infringing item after notification of the infringement.14 In the absence of these broad immunity
shields, platforms such as Google would have to consider their potential liability based on defamation and related tort theories, or copyright law. These costs would be directly related to scale and would
compel platforms to monitor their information services in order to
minimize liability. The cost of monitoring would constrain the platforms’ incentive to expand. The platforms would have to be much more
protective than they are now against harms created by platform
speech. Since privacy is also protected by tort law, platforms would
also have to be more vigilant toward the privacy of consumer data
transferred to other entities.
10. Rory Cellan-Jones & Mark Levene, The Most Valuable Company in the World,
BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/z9x6bk7 [https://perma.unl.edu/MFV8-K236]
(last visited July 13, 2019).
11. Alphabet Revenue 2006– 2019, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.net/
stocks/charts/GOOG/alphabet/revenue [https://perma.unl.edu/2Q2K-FR75] (last
visited July 8, 2019).
12. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2017). A platform such as Google could be penalized for failing to
comply with a takedown order. In this case, the path to a penalty would involve a
platform user going to court and seeking a court order requiring the takedown,
after which the platform may be punished by the court for failing to comply with
the order. Of course, to describe this process is also to note how unlikely it is that
a platform actually will be forced to pay a significant penalty.
13. Alina Selyukh, The New Clash Between Free Speech and Privacy: Section 230: A
Key Legal Shield for Facebook, Google is About to Change, NPR (Mar. 21, 2018,
5:11 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/03/21/591622450/
section-230-a-key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change [https://per
ma.unl.edu/SW5T-25C4].
14. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010).
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Although this Article is about competition issues, the foregoing features of digital platforms have generated important problems currently viewed as unrelated to competition—though, that view may be
incorrect.15 One problem is the matter of harms created by platform
communication. Platform expression often results in injuries such as
defamation, invasion of privacy, online harassment, and intellectual
property infringement. A platform such as Google might direct users
to a link with defamatory statements about an individual, without
suffering any risk of liability, or the platform may host material in
violation of a copyright, again without suffering a risk of liability. The
result has been rampant intellectual property theft and the dissemination of harmful speech.16
Consider, for example, YouTube, the video platform owned by
Google. Google hires platform moderators and uses artificial intelligence to monitor and take down videos that are extremely distasteful
or that involve obvious copyright violations. In addition, an individual
who thinks he has been defamed can file a form with Google to attempt to persuade it to take down the offending video. Given Section
230 immunity, the key factor that motivates Google in screening content is a concern for its own brand, which may be tarnished by hosting
offensive material on its search engine or YouTube platform. This is a
different set of incentives than those created by defamation or by copyright law. It is not at all clear that a concern for brand tarnishment
will lead a platform to exercise the same care in monitoring postings
than would a concern over the risk of liability. A concern for brand
tarnishment might cause a digital platform to be too quick to take
down some types of harmful expression and at the same time too slow
to take down other types. Platform expression that tends to aggravate
or upset the median platform consumer, for example, would be quickly
taken down as a result of current incentives to minimize brand
tarnishment. Platform expression that does not tend to aggravate the
15. The view may be incorrect because competition would compel platforms to compete with respect to enhancing consumer privacy protections and minimizing the
dissemination of harmful speech. In the absence of both competition and liability,
platforms have relatively weak (or distorted) incentives to protect consumers.
16. For an impassioned presentation of claims of Google’s facilitation and participation in intellectual property theft, see Scott Cleland, The Evidence Google’s Systematic Theft is Anti-Competitive, FORBES (Jan. 20, 2012, 10:53 AM), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/scottcleland/2012/01/20/the-evidence-googles-systematic-theftis-anti-competitive/ [https://perma.unl.edu/TAD8-TEM5]. On the dissemination
of harmful speech on platforms such as Google, see Lisa Eadicicco, Facebook and
Google Are Going to War Against Hate Speech, TIME (May 31, 2016), http://time
.com/4352179/facebook-twitter-google-hate-speech/ [https://perma.unl.edu/Y92BN5KA]; and Caitlin Elizabeth Ring, Hate Speech in Social Media: An Exploration
of the Problem and Its Proposed Solutions, 5–14 (Jan. 1, 2013) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado) (on file with Journalism & Mass Communication Graduate Theses & Dissertations, University of Colorado).
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median user, while at the same time imposing concentrated harm on a
single individual or firm, such as copyright violation, is unlikely to
generate incentives for quick action on the part of the platform.
To get a sharper sense of how brand tarnishment incentives work,
consider the demographics of Google users. Search consumers between the ages of 18 and 44 are most likely to use Google, while older
consumers are more likely to use Bing.17 As far as employees, the average age at Google is 29 years old.18 Google is sensitive to the preferences of employees as well as those of users.19 These demographic
differences should generate different incentives with respect to brand
tarnishment. Given the demographic data, Google’s moderators are
likely to be especially sensitive to the preferences of consumers below
the age of 40. Yet another stress factor loading on top of the age distribution of users is the tendency of millennial consumers to demand
that the brands with which they associate also agree with their political preferences.20
Even with all of these issues, one point that should not go unnoticed is that the most popular digital platforms, Google and Facebook,
have demonstrated the usefulness of data in advertising. Before the
rise of digital platforms, the advertising industry was dominated by
firms that claimed to have a special expertise in discerning what sales
pitches should be made to consumers. The new digital platforms are
displacing this ancient system based on subjective expertise with one
based on data measuring consumer preferences. The consequence has
been that advertising-based platforms that do not directly measure
17. See Rebecca Sentance, What Are the Differences in How Age Demographics
Search the Internet?, USERZOOM (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.userzoom.com/blog/
what-are-the-differences-in-how-age-demographics-search-the-internet/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/DUN4-4D6K] (“[U]sers aged anywhere between 18 and 44 were
most likely to be using Google to search the web. Users aged between 45 and 64
were most likely to be found using Bing (with usage being most common among
the 55–64 age group), while for users aged 65+, Yahoo! was the most popular
search engine.”).
18. Max Nisen, A 64-Year-Old Engineer Is Suing Google for Age Discrimination,
QUARTZ (Apr. 24, 2015), https://qz.com/390835/google-age-discrimination/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/PM5T-SNWT].
19. In 2018, a group of Google engineers refused to work on technology that would
help Google secure a military contract because they opposed, on moral grounds,
Google’s contribution to the technology. See Mark Bergen, Google Engineers Refused to Build Security Tool to Win Military Contracts, BLOOMBERG (June 21,
2018, 3:09PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-21/google-engi
neers-refused-to-build-security-tool-to-win-military-contracts [https://perma.unl
.edu/YA8B-8TV7].
20. A 2015 Study by Nielson found 81% of millennials expect their favorite companies to make public declarations of good corporate citizenship. Sarah Landrum,
Millennials Driving Brands to Practice Socially Responsible Marketing, FORBES
(Mar. 17, 2017, 12:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahlandrum/2017/03/
17/millennials-driving-brands-to-practice-socially-responsible-marketing/#723dd
fa94990 [https://perma.unl.edu/4UBM-ENUD].
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consumer preferences, such as newspapers, have seen their advertising dollars migrate to Google and Facebook.
III. COMPETITION ISSUES
Digital platforms have generated competition complaints in recent
years. This Part considers three anticompetitive theories related to
digital platforms: kill zone expropriation, acquisition of nascent rivals,
and denial of access to data.
A. Kill Zone Expropriation
One class of anticompetitive theories alleged against digital platforms falls under the label “kill zone” expropriation.21 A digital platform provides an ecosystem for new businesses in the form of software
applications. However, the platform owner often has the power to destroy applications on its platform. Thus, any application on the platform is within the kill zone of the platform owner.22
The classic example of the kill zone problem, as well as current
operative antitrust law, is provided by United States v. Microsoft
(Microsoft III).23 The platform in this case was the desktop of the
Microsoft operating system. Independent vendors created software applications that could operate on the Microsoft system. Over the years,
the Microsoft operating system had improved in quality by integrating
numerous software functions that previously had been offered by independent software vendors as separate applications that could be purchased and installed on the operating system.
Microsoft III dealt with Microsoft’s conduct toward Netscape Navigator, an independent web browser that had become a popular application on the Microsoft operating system. In response to Navigator’s
popularity, Microsoft integrated its own browser, Internet Explorer,
into the operating system. This meant that anyone who purchased the
Microsoft operating system did not have to purchase a separate
browser. Netscape complained that Microsoft’s integration of Internet
Explorer as a component of its operating system effectively killed
Navigator.
The following is an example of the kill zone phenomenon involving
Google. An innovator creates a new vertical search service (a search
“subplatform,” such as Yelp, generating search results under a broad
21. On kill zones in the technology sectors, see Into the Danger Zone: American Tech
Giants Are Making Life Tough for Startups, ECONOMIST (June 2, 2018), https://
www.economist.com/business/2018/06/02/american-tech-giants-are-making-lifetough-for-startups [https://perma.unl.edu/7UFS-EYQJ] [hereinafter Danger
Zone].
22. Of course, even applications not on the platform can fall within the kill zone of a
digital platform. However, such replication is a standard competitive strategy.
23. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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topic or media type) on Google comparing restaurants in a given locality. Google, in response, creates a competing vertical search platform
replicating that of the innovator. The original vertical search platform
loses traffic and, therefore, advertising revenue as users focus on
Google’s service. Google has an inherent advantage in attracting users
to its own vertical search subplatforms. After all, Google has an enormous trove of data on user search activity, and can determine which
features of a vertical search function are particularly attractive to
users. Google can determine the ranking of its own vertical search application. In the competition between the vertical search platform innovator and Google, Google is certain to win. Any innovation that
occurs within the Google search domain is inherently within Google’s
kill zone.
The following is a version of the kill zone game involving Apple. A
software innovator creates a new app for the Apple App Store. Apple
notices that the new app sells at a brisk pace and decides to offer its
own version of the app as part of the iPhone operating system. Again,
Apple is in a position to observe the features the innovator’s app that
are particularly attractive to consumers, and to replicate and improve
upon those features.
An important characteristic of the kill zone phenomenon is that
the platform owner has the luxury of sitting back and watching innovation occur on its platform. When it spots an especially productive
innovation, the platform owner can leap and swallow it whole. This
means that any innovator on the platform knows that there is an upper limit to its profit from innovation, which triggers expropriation by
the platform owner.
Replication is not the only route through which the platform owner
can expropriate the platform innovator. An alternative strategy, to the
same effect, is for the platform owner to approach the innovator with
an acquisition offer. In this scenario, the innovator at least has the
prospect of receiving a payoff for suffering expropriation. The payoff,
however, may be unremunerative. The platform owner has the option
to replicate the innovator’s application cheaply, or to make an acquisition offer to the innovator. Given that the cost of replication is low, the
owner would not have an incentive to offer a buyout that is significantly greater than the cost of replication.
One’s first reaction to this tale is probably to think that the kill
zone game is harmful to platform innovation. However, when the platform owner replicates a particular innovative function and integrates
the function into the platform, it enhances the entire platform, which
is itself a form of innovation with benefits to consumers. The benefits
to consumers are necessarily greater with replication and integration
of a productive functionality across the entire platform than with the
functionality residing exclusively within a stand-alone application re-
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siding on the platform. Integration within the platform motivates or
enables other applications to exploit the new functionality, which enhances the utility provided by other applications residing on the
platform.
It is not within the long-term interests of the platform to expropriate application innovators before they are able to make a return that
fully compensates for the costs of innovation. A forward-looking platform owner would give the application innovator some time to earn
profits from the innovation before swooping in and killing off the application. Of course, platform owners may not always act within their
long-term interests. The short-run profits from expropriation may exceed the perceived long-run costs of discouraging innovators on the
platform. If there is competition among platforms, the platform owners who expropriate their innovators too quickly should lose relative to
those who wait longer. But where there is no such competition, the
only factor standing as an obstacle to premature expropriation, and
the consequent discouragement of innovation on the platform, is the
ability of the platform owner to correctly evaluate its long-term interests. For example, in the case of vertical search subplatforms, there
appears to be no competitive constraint on expropriation by Google,
since the subplatform would prefer to be identifiable by the dominant
search engines, even if it were possible to hide from a particular
search engine.
Another factor to consider is that application innovators are aware
of the platform owner’s incentives in the kill zone game. Knowing the
risk of expropriation, platform innovators can adopt strategies that
enable profitable entry in spite of the risk of future expropriation. One
strategy is to enter with a suite of platform applications. The application most likely to be expropriated by the platform owner can serve as
a gateway to other applications within the suite. When expropriation
occurs, the innovator would lose the profits from the expropriated application while gaining in profit from the related applications. As the
date of expropriation approaches, the innovator would hike the price
on the targeted application to squeeze as much money out of it as possible before the expropriation date.
Many observers have noted that venture capital firms will not fund
innovators within the kill zone of a platform owner.24 This is important evidence of the negative innovation effect of kill zone expropriation. However, such observations are largely anecdotal. Between 2008
and 2018, the number of apps in Apple’s App Store increased from 500
to 2 million.25 This huge growth rate, 4,000% over ten years, is hard to
square with the assertion that entry is difficult to encourage within a
24. Danger Zone, supra note 21.
25. See App Store (iOS), WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 7, 2019), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/App
_Store_(iOS) [https://perma.unl.edu/4EJX-D2W4].
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kill zone. Of course, entry could have been greater; perhaps Apple’s
App Store would have a billion apps in the absence of the threat of kill
zone expropriation. Nevertheless, the sheer size of the App Store suggests that quite a large number of entrants are not deterred by the
threat of expropriation.
The kill zone game can be analogized to patent infringement,
where the infringement kills off a patent and makes the market in the
particular innovation competitive. Here, the “infringer” is the platform owner and the “patentee” is the application innovator. The analogy is still imperfect, though, because in the kill zone game,
expropriation has a positive externality across other applications on
the platform. The kill zone game involves infringement with strong
spillover benefits to related markets.
From a social welfare perspective, infringement is not always a
negative. Patents have limited terms because at some point the dynamic gain from innovation is outweighed by the static cost of protection.26 The same social incentives exist within the platform setting.
However, the mere fact that the platform owner eventually expropriates the platform innovator is not by itself proof of inefficiency. Obviously, the private incentives of the platform owner may diverge from
the social incentives for expropriation. This is not apparent, though,
because the platform owner, unlike the infringer in the typical case,
suffers a cost from being too quick to expropriate. Gaining a reputation for swift expropriation deters innovation on the platform, reducing the platform’s long-term value.
The kill zone problem, as described so far, is not primarily an antitrust issue. Indeed, expropriation by the platform owner unambiguously enhances short-run consumer welfare. The sense in which
expropriation might be viewed as anticompetitive is that it may discourage innovation on the platform, and such discouragement may reduce consumer welfare in the long run. Traditional antitrust,
however, has been reluctant to condemn a transaction that obviously
and substantially increases short-term consumer welfare.
One plausible scenario in which kill zone expropriation becomes an
antitrust issue is where the expropriated innovator has the potential
to become a rival to the platform itself. This was the theory underlying
Microsoft III. The Justice Department argued, successfully, that the
Netscape Navigator browser was a species of software called “middleware.” Middleware, according to the Justice Department, sat functionally between the operating system (“hardware”) and applications
(“software”). In theory, independent software developers could write
applications that are integrated with, or capable of being loaded onto,
26. RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS
THE WORLD OF IDEAS, 52–57 (2013).
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the browser. As more software developers target the browser as a
launching ground, according to Justice’s theory, the operating system
would become commoditized, and a competitive market in operating
systems would arise. Thus, expropriating Netscape Navigator through
replication and integration, as Microsoft did, prevented a rival platform from arising.
This antitrust theory raises significant questions of proof. How, for
example, could one determine if the alleged middleware product would
become, within a reasonable period, a rival to the operating system?
Almost two decades have passed since Microsoft III and still no middleware product has arisen as an alternative to the major desktop operating systems.27 This experience belies the government’s theory in
Microsoft III. While the theory that kill zone expropriation can violate
Section 2 of the Sherman Act is plausible, courts should demand considerable evidence in support of the theory to avoid imposing antitrust
liability on platforms on the basis of purely conjectural harms to
consumers.
A second plausible sense in which kill zone expropriation becomes
a potential antitrust issue arises when the platform owner replicates
not only the functionality of the innovator but also the informational
details to such a level that the innovator’s application cannot differentiate itself from the platform owner’s clone. Suppose, for example, the
platform owner infringes copyrighted material residing in the application or strips out (non-copyrightable) information contributed by users
of the application.28 Such a complete replication would expropriate
much of the experience-based value of the application. Although no
court in the U.S. has entertained an antitrust claim based on such a
theory, this hypothetical describes a species of competitive predation
and should be actionable under the antitrust laws.

27. James Grimmelman helpfully noted that the middleware platform market has
indeed expanded rapidly since the Microsoft III decision, with the most prominent example being Google’s Chrome OS. However, the desktop PC market remains dominated by Microsoft (Windows) and Apple (macOS). Google’s Android
dominates the market in smartphone operating systems. The stasis in the
desktop market has resulted probably because the incremental efficiencies provided by browser-based systems such as Chrome OS have not been sufficient to
compel desktop users to migrate in large numbers to such middleware platforms.
28. The scope of copyright liability might be uncertain, and therefore present a disincentive to replicating an application. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750
F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). If the platform owner is uncertain about liability from
replication, it may choose to make an acquisition bid rather than replicate. Still,
the acquisition bid will be biased downward by the ease of replication and the low
probability of copyright liability.
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B. Acquisition of Nascent Rivals
Another competition issue involves the acquisition of nascent rivals. In this case, the platform owner acquires a firm—a fledgling
platform—that could grow into a rival. The common example is
Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram in 2012.
The difficult question is determining whether the acquisition of a
fledging platform by a larger platform constitutes acquisition of a nascent rival. The fledging platform may cater to a different set of consumers. One platform may cater to consumers over the age of thirty
while the other platform caters to consumers under the age of thirty.
This poses the same risk to competition as the acquisition by one engine maker of another engine maker who sells in a different (non-substitutable) market29—for example, a manufacturer of car engines
acquires a manufacturer of airplane engines. As time passes, and consumers gain access to air taxis and other such modes of travel, the car
engine may become obsolete and replaced, for most consumers, by the
airplane engine. To the extent that experience in manufacturing car
engines can be transferred to manufacturing airplane engines, the acquisition may have efficiency features, with little anticompetitive
harm. Similarly, the joining of two digital platforms that are not competing would appear to offer efficiency gains, in the form of consolidation of fixed costs and aggregation of data, with little potential for
competitive harm.
This description may be applicable to Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram. Though many commentators suggest that antitrust authorities would block the acquisition if it were proposed for approval
today,30 it is not clear that the acquisition was anticompetitive.
Facebook, which initially catered to the young, is on the path to be29. See U.S. v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 218 (1913) (“It is as lawful for one corporation
to make every part of a steam engine, and to put the machine together, as it
would be for one to make the boilers and another to make the wheels. Until the
one intent is nearer accomplishment than it is by such a juxtaposition alone, no
intent could raise the conduct to the dignity of an attempt.”).
30. Tim Wu, The Case for Breaking Up Facebook and Instagram, WASH. POST (Sept.
28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/09/28/case-breakingup-facebook-instagram/?utm_term=.32da07378665 [https://perma.unl.edu/
KRG7-UVEC]. See also Sally Hubbard, The Case for Why Big Tech is Violating
Antitrust Laws, CNN (Jan. 2, 2019, 10:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/02/
perspectives/big-tech-facebook-google-amazon-microsoft-antitrust/index.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/TYL7-RHZX] (arguing that Facebook acquisition of Instagram was anticompetitive); Robert Reich, Break up Facebook (and While We’re
at It, Google, Apple and Amazon), THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2018, 3:00 PM), https:/
/www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/20/facebook-google-antitrustlaws-gilded-age [https://perma.unl.edu/2VZE-67RH] (arguing to break up big
tech and resurrect antitrust).
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coming the social network for seniors.31 Instagram caters to a younger
group. Given that a social network consisting of people over the age of
forty may include the parents of most teenagers, the teenagers may
prefer to communicate on a social network that caters to younger people. When the teens become parents themselves, their children may
prefer to communicate within a new social network for their own
generation.
The group that suffers the greatest risk of harm by the merger of
two social networks is advertisers because such consolidation would
reduce competition among networks for advertiser expenditures. However, advertisers might benefit from the richer information and the
efficiencies generated by the aggregation of networks. Facebook’s investments into data processing (for example, artificial intelligence)
constitute a large fixed cost that would have to be replicated across
independent social networks to match each other in efficiency. The
merger enhances the value of investment in such data processing,
which has external effects in generating a greater supply of data
processing engineers.
To the extent consumers are harmed, it is by the absence of social
networks that pursue different policies with respect to privacy and
harmful expression. Mergers among social networks sacrifice the social benefits of diversity in product offerings. The social gain from the
merger is in supply-side efficiency. It is unclear whether the welfare
loss from reduced differentiation is greater than the gain in efficiency.
Ordinarily, such a question is best left to the market. Competition
agencies are not well suited to determine whether the social welfare
from greater product differentiation is greater than the social welfare
from increased efficiency.
A more competitive environment is observed in online search platforms, where Google and Bing dominate the market in the U.S. The
efficiency gains from exploiting search data have not been so asymmetrical as to leave Google the only search platform in the U.S. market. Bing, with a smaller share of the market, has been able to exploit
data efficiencies sufficiently to remain competitive with Google. Some
differentiation has appeared as a result. Bing appears to attract a different set of search consumers. Moreover, competition between Bing
and Google has generated some degree of property in data. Bing compensates users for search, through its rewards system. Such compen31. Panos Mourdoukoutas, A Bearish Sign for Facebook—Aging, FORBES (May 1,
2018, 4:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2018/05/01/abearish-sign-for-facebook-aging/#3cbb44772a0d [https://perma.unl.edu/V2GXTJQM]; Mark Sweney, Is Facebook for Old People? Over-55s Flock in as the
Young Leave, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian
.com/technology/2018/feb/12/is-facebook-for-old-people-over-55s-flock-in-as-theyoung-leave [https://perma.unl.edu/5LGS-57HZ].
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sation effectively recognizes consumer entitlements to data generated
by their online activity. Competitive bidding for data would, over time,
generate a system of property in data.
C. Denial of Access to Data
Another set of potential antitrust theories would point to the control of data as a source of unlawful advantage in digital platform markets. Competitors, it follows, should be given access to the data of
large digital platforms. Such claims would fall under the “essential
facility” theory of antitrust. Under the theory, it may be a violation of
antitrust law to deny access to some facility necessary for competition
in a market.
The essential facility theory has been rejected, for the most part, by
the Supreme Court. Under Trinko,32 antitrust claims based on a supposed duty, of a dominant firm or a group of firms, to share a facility
are governed by a specific intent test. To prove an antitrust violation,
the plaintiff has to show that there is no legitimate or procompetitive
rationale that might explain the denial of access. The evidence must
convincingly support an inference that the dominant firm sought to
destroy its rival. Essential facility theories are unlikely to fare any
better in the courts when they involve digital platforms than when
they involve physical infrastructure such as access to telecommunications networks. In either case, the incentives generated by a duty-toshare rule are complicated and potentially undesirable.33
Useful data do not fall out of the sky and into the laps of digital
platforms. Google must create its data using the search inquiries of
consumers. Social welfare probably cannot be enhanced by expropriating data from Google, even if the government or a third party could
develop the skills to construct a database and to exploit it. If the government were to expropriate data from Google for the benefit of other
firms, it would injure Google’s incentives to harvest and process the
data. If the government were to attempt to replicate Google by harvesting raw search inquiries, it would raise more serious privacy issues than exist now and generate the problem of how the government,
within a reasonable budget, could possibly replicate Google’s data
processing capabilities.
Some have suggested that data should be treated as the labor of
the digital platform user.34 I find this theory dubious. First, labor typically consists of activity engaged in for the purpose of generating a
useful product or service sought by some entity or individual. This def32. Verizon Commc’ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
33. See, e.g., KEITH HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW
EVOLUTION 207–11 (2003).
34. ERIC A. POSNER & GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND
DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY, 208–13 (2018).
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inition does not fit much of the activity of online consumers, such as
watching videos for entertainment on YouTube. To call such activity
labor merely because it produces data that are useful to Google is
equivalent to calling the act of driving on a toll road labor because it
produces revenue for the operators of the toll road. Moreover, the online consumer does not give the data in an immediately useful form to
the platform; the platform must create data from the user’s activity on
the platform. Most of the labor, as the term traditionally is understood, occurs on the side of the platform, not on the consumer’s side.
Second, much of the activity of consumers on digital platforms should
be described as leisure rather than labor. Consider, for example, the
numerous consumers of YouTube who enjoy watching videos of cats.
Should the activity of watching cat videos be defined as labor merely
because it generates data for Google? If so, many other activities that
we associate with leisure may be recharacterized as labor.
Of course, there are many things we do today that we call labor
that might have been viewed as leisure in the past. The activity of
writing this piece for this symposium perhaps would have been viewed
as a form of leisure two hundred years ago, when most labor involved
physically demanding activity. If not leisure, perhaps writing would
have been considered a type of sport, engaged in by members of the
social elite. In a Veblenesque society, such activity would be consistent
with that of a member of the class that engages mostly in adventure
and control over government, while another class actually worked to
produce items and services to meet the immediate consumption needs
of the population.35
The line between labor and leisure perhaps cannot be drawn easily
today by looking at the physical or mental demands of the activity
alone. However, one feature of leisure, in contradistinction to labor, is
that an individual can quit a leisure activity at any time without suffering a harm. Someone who watches cat videos can stop and there is
no personal loss suffered as a result—other than the loss of the idiosyncratic utility generated by watching cat videos. Someone who stops
a labor activity faces the harm that follows failing to produce something with an appropriable market value or that would be of interest
for purchase by someone else. Much of the activity of consumers on
digital platforms fails to meet this test.
IV. ANTITRUST LAW
Antitrust law has only begun to deal with the issues discussed
above. As noted earlier, Microsoft III provides the template for plaintiffs for any kill zone expropriation claim. The difficult part is deter35. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY

OF THE

LEISURE CLASS (1899).
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mining whether a venture “killed off” by a dominant platform’s
expropriation had the potential to become a rival to the platform.
Consider, for example, Google’s expropriation of vertical search
services. The European Commission found an antitrust violation, but
the FTC refused to file an antitrust complaint, based on Section 5 of
the FTC Act, against Google for the same conduct. For an expropriated vertical search subplatform to bring a successful Section 2 claim
against Google under Microsoft III, the plaintiff would have to persuade a court that Google’s expropriation enabled Google to maintain
monopoly power in the general “universal” search market. One obstacle such a plaintiff would find is that Google’s market share in universal search now stands at roughly 63%.36 This is below the numerical
threshold of 64% that Judge Hand deemed doubtful in Alcoa37 as a
sign of monopoly status. Market share statistics are by no means determinative of monopoly power, which is generally a function of market share, supply-side substitution possibilities, and demand-side
substitution possibilities.38 Still, Google’s 63% market share is well
below the market share percentages observed in the major monopolization cases, such as Alcoa and Microsoft III. Moreover, as Google has
often repeated, competition, primarily in the form of Bing, is only one
click away. The ease of demand side substitution is notable.
The second difficulty facing an expropriated vertical search service
that attempts to sue Google on the theory of Microsoft III is that it is
highly unlikely that any vertical search subplatform could ever become a rival to Google in universal search. The monopolization theory
in Microsoft III was accepted as plausible by the trial court because
the Justice Department offered a reasonably persuasive theory that
Netscape Navigator was one of several middleware products that
could eventually displace the Microsoft operating system. Again, experience has not provided support to Justice’s theory. At the time of the
lawsuit, however, the theory seemed plausible. In the universal search
market, by contrast, there is no reason to believe that a vertical search
subplatform will replace Google in the foreseeable future.
Instead of relying on Microsoft III, the expropriated vertical service
could sue Google on the theory that it has monopolized the vertical
search market through replication. But this is obviously an implausible antitrust theory. No court would hold that a dominant firm violates the Sherman Act merely by offering a competing product.
However, as suggested earlier, a complete expropriation of not only
the functionality of the vertical service but also the accumulated infor36. Market Share of Search Engines in the United States 2008–2019, STATISTA (Dec.
2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/267161/market-share-of-search-en
gines-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.unl.edu/RMR9-F8LV].
37. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
38. See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 33, at 230–43.
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mation residing in the service (for example, consumer reviews) would
appear to be a type of predation. In this event, it should be a sufficient
remedy for the platform owner to stop replicating the information on
the application and purge the stolen information from the clone. The
advantages of the platform owner over the innovator would remain
substantial without the stripped-out information.
The expropriation of vertical search services is admittedly a vexing
problem under the law. It seems unfair that Google watches the development of vertical search subplatforms and when a particularly valuable one appears, Google replicates, and thereby kills or badly injures,
the subplatform. However, as noted earlier in the case of Apple and its
App Store, it is not within Google’s self-interest to replicate every valuable subplatform before the subplatform innovator can recoup its development costs. Such an aggressive posture would discourage the
development of vertical search subplatforms, to Google’s long-term
detriment. Indeed, if subplatform developers began generally to perceive Google’s platform as a hostile environment because of the risk of
expropriation, they would flock to Bing’s search platform. As more
subplatform developers migrated along this path, Bing eventually
would gain a reputation as a superior search engine to Google.
Amex has gained attention because of its implications for digital
platforms,39 though it is mostly an old economy case. Credit card networks existed long before digital platforms. The case involved an antitrust challenge to American Express’s (Amex) anti-steering
provisions, which sought contractually to prevent a merchant from
persuading a purchaser to use some other method of payment than
the Amex card.
Amex treats the credit card market as a two-sided market involving consumers on one side and merchants on the other. This is a feature of many digital platforms. Google has search consumers on one
side and advertisers on the other. Bing’s rewards program is an example of a negative price charged to consumers on one side of the platform while charging a positive price to advertisers on the other.
Google does not offer rewards for searching, so it charges a zero price
to consumers.40
39. See, e.g., Mark MacCarthy, What ‘Ohio v. AMEX’ Really Means for Tech, CIO:
TECH POL’Y PERSP. (Mar. 26, 2018, 12:32 PM), https://www.cio.com/article/32654
54/what-ohio-v-amex-really-means-for-tech.html [https://perma.unl.edu/ADA4TRAB]; Joyce Jung Min Yeo, Ohio v. American Express: Should Tech Giants
Thank AMEX?, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (Oct. 7, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://cblr
.columbia.edu/ohio-v-american-express-should-tech-giants-thank-amex/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/REB2-YYUK].
40. Of course, the zero price on Google could be interpreted as a negative price because it fails to cover some imputation of incremental cost to the consumer. However, this interpretation would greatly complicate any attempt to use prices as a
method of inferring monopoly power.
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Some would argue that Google consumers “pay” by permitting
Google to track their activity and harvest data from it. However, from
the consumer’s perspective, Google saves them time and money.
Rather than spend hours in the library researching a topic, the consumer can find the answer quickly through Google. In the course of
doing so, the consumer gives data to Google. The same phenomenon
will arise when most automobiles track driver activity and return the
resulting data to the manufacturer. When that day arrives, one will be
able to argue that drivers “pay” for the activity of driving by giving
data to car manufacturers. But why would a driver “pay” to use his
own car? Because it is so much faster than walking.
The foregoing analogy between driving a car and using Google illustrates concerns over the questionable uses of the terms “labor” and
“paying with time” to describe consumer activity on digital platforms.
The platform consumer is not paying in the normal sense of the term.
He voluntarily puts himself in an environment where the platform can
gain from harvesting data from his activity. In a competitive environment, that gain to the platform will translate into lower prices, or perhaps negative prices, to the consumer. Competition is the reason we
observe Bing offering rewards to lure search consumers from Google.
Amex holds that both sides of a two-sided market must be taken
into account in an assessment of the relevant market and market
power. Evidence that merchants are being charged high prices is insufficient to generate an inference of market power, or abuse, without
some analysis of the benefits accruing to consumers on the other side
of the credit card network. In a two-sided market, such as the Amex
credit card network, the provider may find that its optimal strategy is
to charge a negative price on one side and a positive price on the other
of the platform. The observation of a positive or monopolist-seeming
price on one side of the market is not necessarily a sign of monopoly
power. Indeed, in the credit card network, every transaction involves
both a theoretical price charged by the platform to the consumer and a
price charged by the platform to the merchant. The actual price
charged by the platform for every transaction is the sum of the two
prices. Since the consumer’s price is negative, the sum of the two
prices is less than the price charged to the merchant.
Although Amex is about market power, it is also about the scope
and usefulness of efficiency defenses. Consider the efficiency case for
Amex’s restrictions. If merchants regularly assert to consumers that
they accept the Amex card, and then persuade consumers who shop in
their stores to use a different card for purchase, then they gain the
benefit of attracting Amex cardholders while avoiding the fee of servicing their card. The merchant fee, however, is what funds the rewards Amex gives to cardholders, and thereby retains their loyalty to
the Amex card. Thus, when Amex seeks to restrict merchants from
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steering consumers away from the Amex card, it is seeking to block a
type of competition among cards at the till, in order to promote competition among cards. Amex cannot fund its promotional efforts in the
market for cards if merchants pretend to accept the card without really accepting it.
At first blush, Amex seems to be a case about honest dealing. As a
preliminary matter, it seems doubtful that Firm A should be prevented by the law from entering into contracts with merchants in
which it asks those merchants not to both pretend that customers can
use a certain service of Firm A at their store, and at the same time
dissuade customers from doing so. One should have a strong argument not to permit such a contract. After all, the merchant is entirely
free to reject the contract and go without the services of Firm A. But
antitrust often rejects freedom of contract principles, and so it is
worthwhile to consider the economic argument in more depth.
If the Amex card network were no different from any other card
network other than the rewards, then it would be difficult to see a
strong efficiency case. This would be no different from a large purchaser demanding a rebate. If a large purchaser demands a rebate,
then the result is procompetitive in a sense, but the efficiency case is
ambiguous. The large purchaser’s rebate might force prices higher for
other consumers.
The analogy between the Amex network and a large purchaser demanding a rebate illustrates an interesting feature of the vocal Amex
critique. Critics of Amex have in essence taken the position that a
large purchaser should not be permitted to demand a discount from a
seller. This position may or may not be consistent with enhancing consumer welfare. It is, however, advocating a restriction on a facet of
competition. Moreover, to remain consistent with the anti-Amex position, one should also support efforts on the part of retailers to resist
demands for rebates or discounts by large purchasers. A most favored
nation contract, for example, would facilitate the resistance by sellers
of demands for discounts from buyers. Also consistent with the position would be support to retailers when they combine to resist demands for discounts, such as by forming an agreement to refuse to
discount. Note that these arguments run ineluctably into the position
of supporting collusive conduct.
However, Amex is not clearly the same scenario as that of a large
purchaser demanding a rebate. Amex cardholders constitute a desirable portion of the market of retail consumers, both because they are
wealthier than the average and are more likely to make a purchase. If
a merchant advertises that he accepts the Amex card, then he attracts
those consumers to his store. Since the consumers tend to be wealthier
with a higher propensity to spend, the merchant is more likely to offer
a range of products and services catering to this type of consumer.
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Merchants who accept the Amex card also gain access to informational
services provided by Amex to its merchant customers.41 Thus, the
Amex card serves as a coordinating device, attracting consumers with
a propensity to spend and signaling to those consumers that the
merchant offers products and services of their liking. Providing notice
that the card is accepted suggests to those consumers that the
merchant will offer a higher level of service (attributable in part to the
informational services of Amex) to the consumer than does the average retailer. Just as retail price maintenance may be a method of ensuring brand promotion, customer service, and loyalty on the part of
the retailer, the Amex card may serve to support a similar commitment between the retailer and the Amex consumer.
To the extent merchants compete to attract the Amex consumer,
they will attempt to take on the features of outlets that cater to such
consumers, and this competition generates positive externalities for
consumers who do not carry the Amex card but who also shop in the
same stores. For example, Amex claims to offer superior fraud protection services, which benefit both consumer and merchant. To the extent those services deter fraud and identity theft or enable merchants
to better detect credit card fraud generally, there is a benefit to noncard consumers.
Merchants who accept the Amex card will tend to be different from
the merchants who do not accept it. Generally, small businesses and
those catering to consumers of average wealth and propensity to
spend do not accept the Amex card.42
The efficiencies associated with Amex’s conduct are recognized in
the Sylvania doctrine,43 which prescribes rule of reason analysis
where intrabrand competition is restricted to enhance interbrand
competition. In Sylvania, the Court held that rule of reason analysis
applies to territorial restrictions imposed by a manufacturer on its retailers. The rationale for adopting the rule of reason test is that such
restrictions enhance promotion and service by retailers, even though
they limit competition among retailers of a particular brand. In particular, such restrictions enhance promotion and service by retailers primarily by removing the incentive among retailers in a particular
brand to free ride off the promotion and service offered by other retailers. A retailer could free ride off another by cutting its service costs
41. On merchant analytics services, see Mary Hurn, AmEx Debuts Consulting and
Analytics Arm for Business Customers, DATA STRATEGY TECH. (Nov. 19, 2009),
https://www.dmnews.com/data/news/13062182/amex-debuts-consulting-and-ana
lytics-arm-for-business-customers [https://perma.unl.edu/6U8K-F64B]. Amex
also provided fraud protection services to merchants.
42. Lindsay Konsko, Why Don’t More Retailers Accept American Express?, NERDWALLET (May 9, 2019), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/credit-cards/retailers-acceptamerican-express/ [https://perma.unl.edu/9N4J-S8XC].
43. Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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and then offering lower prices (because costs are lower) to poach customers away from retailers who provide service. Stronger promotion
and service incentives secured by the restrictions, in turn, enhance
the brand’s competitiveness relative to rival brands (interbrand competition effect). In the same sense, Amex’s anti-steering provisions
limit the scope for merchants to free ride (by accepting the card and at
the same time steering customers away from it) on the services Amex
provides.
However, Sylvania, if read in a narrow sense, applies only to vertical, supply-chain relationships. The Supreme Court has never clarified the degree to which Sylvania applies in the horizontal setting,
though it has given hints. The Court cited Sylvania to justify the application of rule of reason analysis in the horizontal setting in both
NCAA v. University of Oklahoma44 and Indiana Federation of Dentists.45 Amex can be understood as providing additional clarification
on the scope of the Sylvania doctrine. Amex indicates that Sylvania
should not be read narrowly as a rule that applies only in vertical relationships between upstream and downstream parties in a supply
chain.
Among digital platforms, the combination of negative and positive
prices is most obvious in the case of Bing. Every search inquiry is a
transaction. For each such inquiry, the advertiser pays a positive price
and the Bing user (if he has signed up for rewards) pays a negative
price. In the case of Google, the price for every search consumer is
zero, while the advertiser pays a positive price for every search. Amex
clearly presents a hurdle for litigants who attempt to argue that Bing
has monopoly power in the market for advertisers, since they would
have to show that the net price has increased in a manner consistent
with monopoly power.
There are two implications of Amex here. First, in many cases, the
benefits to consumers on the other side of the platform will not be as
significant as in Amex.46 Return to the example of Bing’s rewards program. The rewards to search consumers offered by Bing are quite
small on a per-transaction basis in comparison to the prices charged to
advertisers.47 The fact that Bing is a two-sided market does not lead
immediately to the implication that proof of monopoly power is nearly
44. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
45. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
46. On the value of Amex points, see Maximize Monday: What Do 50,000 Amex Points
Get You?, THE POINTS GUY (Apr. 22, 2013), https://thepointsguy.com/2013/09/
maximize-monday-the-best-canadian-credit-cards-and-current-deals/ [https://per
ma.unl.edu/Q4SS-QKL5].
47. On the value of Bing rewards, see Miranda Miller, The Complete Guide to Bing
Rewards: What Are Bing Rewards & How Can You Use Them?, WORDSTREAM
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2015/01/08/bing-rewards
[https://perma.unl.edu/6ZLE-EX2H].
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impossible after Amex because of the difficulty of calculating the net
price of the platform service. In most cases, the rewards to consumers
on the other side of the platform are too trivial to substantially affect
the net price calculation.
Second, Amex can be met by a rough assessment of the magnitude
of benefits, or the negative price on the other side of the market.
Where the benefits on the other side of the platform are substantial,
showing monopoly power, under the “direct evidence” hypothetical
monopoly approach48 will be difficult given Amex.
However, the direct evidence approach is only one of two common
methods of inferring monopoly power. The more traditional approach,
the “indirect evidence” structural approach, involves inferring monopoly power through evidence of a large market share and the existence
of entry barriers. This was the approach followed in Microsoft III. This
common approach to inferring monopoly power is unaffected by Amex.
Moreover, in the background, one should keep in mind that monopoly
power is difficult to define clearly in any event, and even more difficult
to measure. In many applications by courts, the monopoly power test
serves functionally as a screen against intrusive antitrust in settings
where efficiencies are plausible but unlikely to be demonstrated.49
Amex is probably one of those cases.
The Bing example shows why focusing on one side of the market
could lead one astray. Bing does not have monopoly power in the
search market. However, suppose Bing catered to a subset of search
consumers that advertisers prefer to target. For example, Bing users
are a bit older than Google users, and this difference may affect the
prices Bing charges to advertisers. Suppose also that Bing’s rewards
program grew to the point where it offered substantial payoffs to
search consumers. In this scenario, Bing might adopt a strategy of
charging high prices to advertisers coupled with substantial prizes to
consumers.50 An antitrust claim focusing on Bing’s charges to advertisers might propose that the charges should be accepted as evidence
48. By the “direct evidence” approach, I refer to the use of evidence of supracompetitive prices coupled with the reluctance of consumers to substitute other products
in response to those prices. This approach has become a powerful method of proof
in the last two decades. For an example of the direct evidence method, see FTC v.
Staples Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The trial court’s decision finding
monopoly power in the merchant market in Amex was based largely on “direct
evidence” proof submitted by plaintiffs’ expert.
49. Keith N. Hylton, Brown Shoe and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Review of
Industrial Organization, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 95, 97–106 (2011). On the difficulties of measuring market power, see HYLTON, supra note 33, at 230–43.
50. One byproduct of such a strategy is that it would hasten the development of property rights in data. As Bing is observed offering rewards to consumers in exchange for their data, other platforms would feel competitive pressure to do the
same. Such competitive rewards eventually would generate a system of property
in data.
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of market power. A court might be persuaded that Bing has market
power after being presented evidence that advertisers remained with
Bing even after significant price hikes coupled with reward expansions to consumers. Such an inference would be false, because it would
confuse a competitive strategy with evidence of monopoly power.
As another application of Amex to digital platforms, consider Apple
and its App Store. Apple charges a commission of 30% to the app developer. An app might have a price of $0.99 to the consumer, meaning
that Apple takes almost $0.30 from the transaction. The App Store is
a two-sided market, like the credit card network.
For simplicity, let’s treat the app price as $1.00. The revenue to the
app developer who prices at $1.00 is $0.70, so it is as if the developer
sells to the consumer at full price of $1.00, and then pays Apple $0.30.
An alternative way to think of the transaction is that the consumer
pays $0.30 to Apple and $0.70 to the developer. These are equivalent
ways of describing the transaction.
The revenue to the Apple platform is, theoretically, based on a
price charged to both app developer and consumer. The developer pays
a positive price to the platform and the consumer pays nothing to the
platform. However, it would be equally valid to describe the transaction as one where the developer pays nothing and the consumer pays
the commission. Indeed, Apple could easily change the model to one
where the consumer pays a percentage fee directly to the platform for
each transaction. Instead of taking 30% of the price set by the app
developer, Apple could directly charge the consumer 43% of the price
charged by the developer. Assuming the current price of the app is
optimal from the developer’s perspective, altering the allocation of Apple’s charge would not affect the price of the app to the consumer.
Although Apple’s App Store seems initially to have the features of
a two-sided market, as in Amex, it is different. In Amex, the charge to
the merchant cannot simply be passed on to the Amex consumer. In
the App Store, a charge to the merchant can easily be shifted to the
consumer with no material effect (other than relabeling). This suggests that Amex may not be applicable to the App Store. The App
Store is seemingly a two-sided market, but not of the sort observed in
Amex because the optimal allocation of the App Store platform charge
is indeterminate.
Moreover, there is a similarity between the territorial restriction
upheld in Sylvania on rule of reason grounds, and the anti-steering
restriction challenged in Amex. Because of this, Amex should be
viewed as a clarification or amplification of Sylvania. The App Store
has restrictions too, but they are not similar in function to the restriction in Sylvania.
Apple prohibits its app developers from selling apps developed for
the App Store outside of the store and prohibits consumers from
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purchasing apps outside of the store. These restrictions are challenged
in a case now before the Supreme Court: Apple v. Pepper.51 Apple’s
restrictions are designed to protect the quality of products in the App
Store and to enable Apple to engage in price discrimination in the sale
of iPhones. If Apple were prevented from enforcing these restrictions,
it would have to raise the price of the iPhone. This would shrink the
iPhone platform and result in users with low demand for apps subsidizing users with high demand for apps. This suggests that the efficiencies associated with Apple’s restrictions on the App Store are quite
different from those associated with the Amex anti-steering policy.
V. CONCLUSION
Digital platforms raise antitrust complaints because the best
known, Google and Facebook, appear to be monopolists in many of the
markets in which they operate. The platform monopolies that have
appeared have resulted because of economies of scale, not from anticompetitive practices. As digital markets mature, digital platforms
are likely to differentiate and specialize to some degree, easing some
of the current concerns over competition. In the meantime, the business strategies of digital platforms do not present a clear justification
for reforming the antitrust laws.

51. Pepper v. Apple Inc., (In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig.), 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir.
2017), cert. granted sub nom. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 138 S. Ct. 2647 (2018), aff’d
sub. nom. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).

